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Institutionalization of Juveniles:
What Process is Due?
Parham v. J.R., - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979)
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Facts of Parham
In Parham v. J.R.,' the Supreme Court established minimum
due process safeguards for minors committed to state mental insti-
tutions by procedures initiated by their parents or guardians. The
class action 2 suit was brought in the district court 3 by the minors
JL. and J.R., who requested declaratory and injunctive relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. J.R., who was thirteen at the time the suit
was filed, had been removed from his home by a juvenile court
only a few months after his birth because of severe parental ne-
glect. By the age of eight, he had been placed in a total of seven
different foster homes. J.R.'s seventh set of foster parents re-
quested his removal from their home because of his "abnormal be-
havior."' 4 Apparently unable to find adoptive parents for J.R., the
Georgia Department of Family and Children Services applied for
his admission to a state mental hospital. The hospital personnel
admitted J.R., finding him to be mentally ill and diagnosing his
condition as "borderline mental retardation" 5 and "unsocialized,
aggressive reaction of childhood."
'6
After nearly three years of hospitalization, hospital personnel
requested that the Department of Family and Children Services
1. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
2. The class certified by the district court consisted of "all persons younger than
18 years of age now or hereafter received by any defendant for observation
and diagnosis and/or detained for care and treatment at any 'facility' within
the State of Georgia"...... GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971). J.L. v. Parham,
412 F. Supp. 112, 117 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd and remanded sub. nom., Parham
v. J.Rl, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
3. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd and remanded sub.
nom., Parham v. J.R., - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
4. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
5. 412 F. Supp. at 117.
6. Id.
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find a long-term foster home or adoptive home for J.R. because of
their feeling that continued institutionalization would cause J.R. to
regress, and their fear that absent an appropriate placement, J.R.
might become "a permanently institutionalized child.' 7 Two years
later, a foster home had not been obtained for J.R. He subsequent-
ly filed suit, "requesting an order of the court placing him in a less
drastic environment suitable to his needs.
'8
J.L, was taken to a state mental hospital by his mother and
step-father in 1970 at the age of six. He was admitted by hospital
personnel who found him mentally ill, diagnosing his condition as
a "hyperkinetic reaction of childhood."'9 J.L.'s parents agreed to
participate in a family therapy program under which the child was
allowed to go home for short stays. However, the parents re-
quested that the program be discontinued after several months.
After J.L. had been institutionalized for about two years, he was
discharged to his mother.10 He was returned ten days later and
readmitted because "the parents found they were unable to con-
trol J.L. to their satisfaction which created family stress."" In
1973, hospital personnel informed the Department of Family and
Children Services that J.L. should be removed from confinement
and placed in "specialized foster care."'1 2 The department, in turn,
indicated that it could not pay for such care unless J L. was eligible
for federal funds.' 3 J.L. was not eligible, thus the specialized foster
care was not obtained. J.L. was still confined to the mental hospi-
tal when he filed suit in 1975 requesting suitable placement in a
less drastic environment. 14
B. The Decision
The statute under which JMR. and J.L. were committed governs
the voluntary admission of patients to state mental hospitals.' 5
The superintendent of any facility is authorized to receive for ob-
servation and diagnosis any person under eighteen years of age for
7. - U.S. -- 99 S.Ct. at 2498.
8. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
9. 412 F. Supp. at 117.
10. Id.
11. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2497.
12. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
13. 412 F. Supp. at 117.
14. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
15. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971). The statutes of most states allow a parent to
place his child in a mental hospital subject only to the approval of the admit-
ting physician or hospital administrator. For a listing of state statutes with
such provisions, see Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of
Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALL REV. 840, n.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Volunteering Children].
19801
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whom application is made by parent or guardian. 16 If the individ-
ual shows "evidence of mental illness" and is found to be "suitable
for treatment," he may be detained for care and treatment.17 The
superintendent is obliged to discharge patients who recover or for
whom the undesirability of further hospitalization is demonstrated
by sufficient improvement.18 In addition, voluntary patients and
their representatives have the right to apply for discharge.' 9 The
superintendent must ordinarily grant the application unless the
patient is dangerous to himself or others, in which case proceed-
ings for involuntary hospitalization must be initiated.20 However,
in the case of a minor admitted upon application of his parent or
guardian, his release prior to reaching the age of majority may be
conditioned upon the consent of his parent or guardian.
21
J.R. and J.L. attacked the constitutionality of this statutory
scheme as applied to minors, claiming that it deprived them of lib-
erty without a meaningful opportunity to be heard, thus violating
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.22 The state
argued that the mental health care system was designed merely to
assist parents in their traditional parental duties, and that the hos-
pitalization of minors was merely the acceptance of state-provided
care by the parent on behalf of his child.23 Furthermore, the state
argued that the child is sufficiently protected upon admission by
his parents and by the professional judgment of the admitting phy-
sician; and that during the course of hospitalization, he is pro-
tected by the superintendent's continuing duty to discharge
patients who have recovered or who have improved sufficiently
that the superintendent deems hospitalization undesirable.
24
A three-judge district court held that the voluntary commit-
ment statute was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs' class
of juveniles and enjoined its further use by state officials and em-
ployees.25 The court was not persuaded that parental involvement
in the commitment process adequately protected the interests of
the child, since the decision to seek commitment is often a product
16. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 88-503.2.
19. Id. § 88-503.3.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 412 F. Supp. at 118. The plaintiffs did not question nor did the court consider
the constitutional adequacy of the requisite standard for commitment under
the statute, i.e., showing evidence of mental illness and suitability for treat-
ment. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 140.
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of family pathology.26 The court noted that mental institutions are
still viewed by many as "dumping grounds" for unwanted chil-
dren.27 Furthermore the court held as inadequate whatever addi-
tional protection might result from screening by the admitting
physician. The inadequacy was said to be due in part to the inex-
actitude of psychiatry28 and the unavailability of less restrictive al-
ternatives to confinement.29 The court bolstered its conclusion by
citing a report prepared by Georgia's Study Commission on
Mental Health Services for Children and Youth.3 0 After closely
scrutinizing the Georgia mental health care system for six months,
the Commission observed that "more than half of the hospitalized
children and youth would not need hospitalization if other forms of
care were available .... ",31 Accompanying the court's remedy
was an order directing the defendants to provide non-hospital fa-
cilities where appropriate, at state expense.
32
The decision of the district court was reversed on appeal.33
While the Supreme Court recognized that a child has a "substan-
tial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical
treatment"34 the Court also stressed the liberty interests of par-
ents in maintaining their authority over the upbringing of their
children, including the "high duty" to recognize symptoms and
seek medical treatment.35 The Court concluded that the parents
should retain a substantial, if not dominant, role in the commit-
ment decision, but that the risk to the child's interest in remaining
free from unnecessary incarceration precluded allowing the par-
ents absolute and unreviewable discretion. In striking a balance
between the competing interests of parent and child, as well as the
state interest in avoiding undue financial and administrative bur-
dens, the Court held that due process required an independent
evaluation by a staff physician.3 6 The physician, cast in the role of
a "neutral factfinder," must have authority to refuse to admit any
child not satisfying medical admission standards. 3 7 The evaluation
need not amount to a formal or quasi-formal hearing, for "due
process is not violated by use of informal traditional medical inves-
26. Id. at 133.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 138.
29. Id. at 134-35.
30. Id. at 122.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 139.
33. Parham v. J.R., - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
34. Id. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2503.
35. Id. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2504-05.
36. Id. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2506-07.
37. Id.
1980]
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tigative techniques. ' '38
The Parham decision is the most recent application of a three-
factor balancing approach to due process which has evolved in re-
cent Supreme Court opinions.39 The following section outlines the
specific interests involved when this approach is applied to volun-
tary juvenile commitment. The nature of the process which re-
flects the appropriate balancing of these interests 4o and the
applicability in this area of the doctrine of the least restrictive al-
ternative4 ' are the subjects of subsequent sections.
11. DEFINING THE INTERESTS
A. Private Interests-Parent and Child
In Mathews v. Eldridge,42 the Supreme Court abstracted from
earlier decisions43 three factors which ordinarily must be consid-
ered in determining the specific dictates of due process in a given
case:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute pro-
cedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.4 4
It is now well-settled that "constitutional rights do not mature
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-de-
fined age of majority."45 The right of minors to freedom of expres-
sion under the first amendment has been recognized by the
Supreme Court,46 as has the right not to be placed twice in jeop-
38. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2507.
39. See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
40. See text accompanying notes 141-61 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 162-87 infra.
42. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
43. The Court relied primarily on the following four cases: Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974) (government employee's property interest in continued
employment and interest in not being stigmatized balanced against the right
of the Civil Service reasonably to regulate employee job-related activities);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolee's limited liberty interest bal-
anced against state's interests in preventing antisocial acts and restoring pa-
rolee to useful life); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients'
property interest in continued benefits balanced against state interest in con-
serving fiscal and administrative resources); Cafeteria and Restaurant Work-
ers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (property interest of worker in
continued employment at specific governmental installation balanced against
governmental security interest and right to discretion in exercising proprie-
tary functions).
44 424 U.S. at 335.
45. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
46. Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
[Vol. 59:190
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ardy for the same offense in state criminal proceedings. 47 The lib-
erty interest of minors was recognized by the Supreme Court over
fifty years ago.48 More recent cases have made it clear that a mi-
nor's liberty interest is entitled to the protections of due process
whenever the state itself initiates actions imposing bodily re-
straints49 or seriously damaging the minor's reputation.50
In addition, the minor has an interest in avoiding the serious
and well-documented dangers that unnecessary institutionaliza-
tion poses to his mental health.51 As one commentator pointed
out, "nearly all long-term hospital patients exhibit flatness of re-
sponse, withdrawal, muteness, and loss of motivation. Once be-
lieved to be part of the degenerative process of mental illness,
these phenomena are now universally accepted-even by public
hospital administrators-as responses to hospitalization itself
.... -52 Thus, the minor's liberty interest is not limited to avoid-
ing physical restraint, but in avoiding the potentially negative im-
pact of institutional conditions.53
The liberty interest of a minor is not coextensive with that of an
adult. The state has within its police power a broader authority
over the activities of children than it has over adults. 54 In order to
protect the welfare of children, states may permissibly regulate
such activities as child labor55 and the obtaining of sex-related ma-
terial by minors5 6 even where such a statute would be unconstitu-
tional if applicable to all persons generally.57 Thus, a minor has
only a conditional liberty interest, but it is one which cannot be
abridged by the state arbitrarily and without due process of law.58
The Parham Court acknowledged that a child "has a substan-
47. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
48. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
49. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. Id.; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
51. See, e.g., R. BARTON, INSTrrUTIONAL NEUROSIS (3d ed. 1976); R. CANCRO, THE
SCHIZOPHRENIC REACTIONS: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT, HOSPITAL TREAT-
MENT, AND CURRENT RESEARCH (1969); D. VAIL, DEHUMANIZATION AND THE IN-
STITUTIONAL CAREER (1966); J. WING & G. BROWN, INSTITuTIONALISM AND
SCHIZOPHRENIA (1970).
52. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally l Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1127 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Alternatives to Commitment].
53. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (discussing the unpleasant conditions to
which a juvenile would be exposed upon "therapeutic" incarceration in an
"Industrial School" for delinquency).
54. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)
55. Id.
56. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
57. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 167.
58. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(holding that a parolee, who remains in the custody of the state, nevertheless
1980]
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tial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical
treatment... ."-59 This claim was not disputed by the state.60 The
Court, however, was not clear with respect to the minor's liberty
interest in avoiding the stigma of erroneous labeling, stating only
that it would assume, without deciding, that the juvenile had a pro-
tectible interest in his reputation.
6 1
With respect to that portion of the plaintiffs' class 62 who were
not wards of the state at the time the commitment process was
initiated, the analysis of private interests must also include the in-
terests of the children's parents. Parental authority has tradition-
ally been protected against state action which "unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control."63 The
major cases establishing this parental interest involved challenges,
frequently on religious grounds, to state statutes regulating the na-
ture,6 content,65 and duration 66 of mandatory public education.
This parental right does not extend, however, to actions which
jeopardize the physical health of the child,6 7 prevent his well-
rounded growth into a mature citizen,68 or carry the potential of
making the child a burden to society.6
9
The Parham Court relied on this area of traditionally protected
parental authority and the common law presumption that parents
act in the best interests of their children to conclude that parents
should retain "a substantial, if not the dominant role" in deciding if
their child requires institutionalization.7 0
has a conditional liberty interest which he cannot be made to forfeit absent
the requirements of procedural due process).
59. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2503.
60. Id.
61. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2503-04.
62. See note 2 supra.
63. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
64. Id. (holding unconstitutional a statute mandating compulsory attendance at
public schools which did not allow parents the option of sending their chil-
dren to private or parochial schools).
65. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a statute prohibiting
the teaching of foreign languages in public schools); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S.
404 (1923) (also invalidating a statute prohibiting teaching of foreign lan-
guages).
66. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down a statute requiring at-
tendance at public schools until age eighteen, as applied to Amish children
who receive vocational training in Amish community).
67. E.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); Wallace v. Labrenz, 411
Ill. 618, 104 N.E 2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952). See generally Gold-
stein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 YALF UJ. 645 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Parental Autonomy].
68. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 168 (1944).
69. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
70. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2505.
[Vol. 59:190
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Thus, the Court relied rather uncritically on a line of cases in-
volving litigation between parents and state to mark out the scope
of parental authority as against the child. As pointed out by Jus-
tice Douglas, dissenting in part to the Court's opinion in Wisconsin
v. Yoder,71 "we have in the past analyzed similar conflicts between
parent and State with little regard for the views of the child ....
Recent cases, however, have clearly held that the children them-
selves have constitutionally protectible interests. '72 The Court in
Yoder specifically refrained from deciding if the state could legiti-
mately assert its authority to supervene parental autonomy on be-
half of children asserting an independent constitutional right.7 3 In
reserving this issue while simultaneously deciding the issue of pa-
rental authority as between parent and state, the Court at least
acknowledged that the issues and interests involved are not identi-
cal.
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,74 the Supreme
Court was finally presented with a case wherein parental authority
came into direct conflict with a minor child's independent asser-
tion of a constitutional right. A Missouri statute required unmar-
ried women under the age of eighteen to obtain parental consent
as a precondition to seeking an abortion.7 5 The state defended the
statute by pointing out that a state may properly subject minors to
more severe restrictions than it can impose on adults. 76 Further-
more, the state argued, the statute serves the purpose of strength-
ening the family unit and safeguarding parental autonomy.7 7 The
Court was not persuaded that the statute would effectively serve
these purposes "where the minor and the nonconsenting parent
are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the preg-
nancy already has fractured the family structure. '78 Unable to find
any significant state interest served by conditioning an abortion on
parental consent, the Court held the provision to be unconstitu-
tional.7 9 The child's independent liberty right prevailed in the ab-
sence of a significant counterveiling state interest.
The Danforth holding marks a significant departure from the
common law rule granting parents the power to make medical de-
cisions for their children.8 0 Previous exceptions had been carved
71. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
72. Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
73. Id. at 231.
74. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
75. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020(4) (Vernon Supp. 1979).
76. 428 U.S. at 72-75.
77. Id. at 75.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See generally Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-Making
1980]
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out where preservation of the child's life or public health and
safety required the child to undergo a medical procedure, and the
parent, for religious reasons or because of simple neglect, failed to
give consent.81 In such cases, the state has generally been held to
have the power to supervene parental autonomy and give consent
for the treatment. However, the opinion of the child "is rarely
mentioned, apparently because it is not known or not considered
relevant, '8 2 and the parent was generally considered to have the
authority to order medical care over the child's objection.83
Professor Bennett, in discussing the allocation of child-care de-
cision-making authority in the context of abortions for minors,
points out that "surely the individual's interest in a medical care
decision diminishes as the medical considerations dominate and
provide a clear answer. On the other hand, as a decision becomes
medically or personally controversial, the individual's interest in
making it for himself increases. '84 The "long-term non-health con-
sequences" of the decision also figure prominently in Bennett's
analysis.85 Because long-term consequences will continue to affect
the child after his emancipation at majority, he has a greater inter-
est in making the controversial decision himself.
The Danforth decision is in accord with this analysis, because
abortion involves a "personally controversial" decision with very
significant long-range non-health consequences. Commitment to a
mental institution also involves a personally and medically 86 con-
troversial decision. The long-range non-health considerations are
at the least very significant (e.g., stigmatization 87 ) and can be over-
whelming as in the case of life-long commitment. Thus, by this
analysis, juvenile commitment should be at least as appropriate an
area as abortion in which to recognize the child's independent in-
terest.
Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 285 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Child Medical Care]; Parental Autonomy, supra note 67.
81. See id.; 30 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1953).
82. Child Medical Care, supra note 80, at 311.
83. See, e.g., Friedrichsen v. Niemotka, 71 N.J. Super. 398, 177 A2d 58 (1962); Wes-
ton's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E.785 (1921).
84. Child Medical Care, supra note 80, at 311.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Szasz, The Child as Involuntary Mental Patient: The Threat of Child
Therapy to the Child's Dignity, Privacy, and Self-Esteem, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1005 (1977).
87. Research on the social effects of stigmatization reveals its negative impact in
such important areas as employment and interpersonal relations. See, e.g.,
Farina & Ring, The Influence of Perceived Mental Illness on Interpersonal Re-
lations, 70 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 47 (196); Lanny, Social Consequences of
Mental Illness, 30 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 450 (1966); Miller & Dawson, Effects of
Stigma on Re-employment of Ex-mental Patients, 49 MENTAL HYGIENE 281
(1965).
[Vol. 59:190
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In Parham, the Court did not assume, as it did in Danforth, that
the child's liberty interest was entitled to vindication absent signif-
icant counterveiling interests. The Parham Court assumed that
the scope of parental authority, as derived from the parent-state
line of cases 88 gives the parent the right to decide for the child in
the first instance: "The fact that a child may balk at hospitalization
... does not diminish the parents' authority to decide what is best
for the child."89 The Court distinguished Danforth, arguing that it
was the grant of an absolute parental veto power which made the
abortion statute constitutionally unsound, and that parents do not,
under the Georgia commitment statute, have an absolute power to
commit their children.90 However, this distinction ignores the fun-
damental teaching of Danforth. It is not merely the degree of
power granted to the parent which is crucial; the significance of
Danforth is that supervention of the child's independent constitu-
tional liberty interest requires adequate justification in the first in-
stance,91 at least where the minor is of sufficient age and
maturity.
92
B. Risk of Error and Value of Additional Safeguards
Under the Georgia voluntary commitment statute, it is the par-
ent or guardian who makes the initial decision to initiate the com-
mitment process for his minor child.93 This decision may be
influenced by a number of factors other than the need of the child
for institutional care. A countercultural lifestyle may be viewed
incorrectly by parents as evidence of psychopathology;94 other be-
havior which is merely unconventional may cause parents to seek
commitment out of irritation or embarrassment.95 The interests of
other children in the family may take precedence over what is best
88. See notes 60-66 & accompanying text supra.
89. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2505.
90. Id.
91. "The fault with [the statute] is that it imposes a special-consent provision,
exercisable by a person other than the woman and her physician, as a prereq-
uisite to a minor's termination of her pregnancy and does so without a suffi-
cient justification for the restriction." 428 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
92. The Court in Danforth did not indicate at what age or level of maturity the
state may appropriately curtail the minor's liberty; it held only that the age of
eighteen, the same age limit involved in the Parham commitment statute,
was impermissibly restrictive. 428 U.S. at 72-75. Cf. In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d
921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977) (holding that fourteen year old
juvenile is entitled independently to assert right to due process in commit-
ment proceedings).
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971).
94. Volunteering Children, supra note 15.
95. Id.
1980]
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for the "disturbed" child.96 The presentation of the child for com-
mitment may be a result of pathology on the part of the parent or
of the entire family, or it may be an attempt to avoid recognition of
larger family problems.97 The parent may be reacting to commu-
nity pressure to institutionalize the child.98 Finally, since the deci-
sion is often made during a time of great family stress, the
alternatives to institutionalization may not receive adequate con-
sideration.99
In light of these extraneous influences on the parental decision
to seek commitment, and the lack of any particular psychiatric or
psychological expertise on the part of the parent, it would seem
reasonable to conclude that the decision carries a very substantial
risk of error. The risk would not appear to be any less substantial
in the case of children who are wards of the state; the placement
decision may turn on administrative or financial considerations 10 0
or the attractiveness of the child to potential foster parents. 10 '
After the decision to seek commitment has been made by the
parent or guardian, the child is taken to the mental health facility
and examined by the admitting physician for "evidence of mental
illness" and to see if he is "suitable for treatment.' 02 This addi-
tional safeguard of an independent psychiatric evaluation will pre-
sumably reduce, to some extent, the risk of error present in the
initial decision to seek commitment. The Parham Court expressed
confidence in "informal traditional medical investigative tech-
niques.' 03 In fact, the Court held that one independent psychiat-
ric evaluation is the only check required by due process on the
parent's or guardian's decision to seek commitment. 104 While the
96. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded-Some Critical Issues, 7 FAM.
L. Q. 1, 9-10 (1973).
97. Vogel & Bell, The Emotionally Disturbed Child as the Family Scapegoa in A
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAmm.y 382-97 (N. Bell & E. Vogel eds., rev. ed.
1968).
98. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 39
(1978), rev'd and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
99. 459 F. Supp. at 39-40; Volunteering Children, supra note 15, at 850-52.
100. Despite repeated requests by hospital personnel to remove J.R. from the in-
stitution to a less restrictive setting, the state agency allowed J.R. to remain
in confinement, 412 F. Supp. at 117. J.L. apparently remained in hospital con-
finement only because he was not eligible to receive federal funds. Id.
101. Id. at 134-35.
102. GA. STAT. ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971).
103. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2507.
104. Id. at -- , 99 S. Ct. at 2506-13.
It is not necessary that the deciding physician conduct a formal or
quasi-formal hearing .... Due process is not violated by use of in-
formal traditional medical investigative techniques .... The mode
and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business
[Vol. 59:190
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Court acknowledged the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, 0 5 the
opinion did not attempt to determine the magnitude of the risk of
error. Such an inquiry would seem crucial in determining the
probable value of this procedural safeguard.
The Supreme Court very recently noted that "psychiatric diag-
nosis ... is to a large extent based on medical 'impressions' drawn
from subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the
diagnostician. This process often makes it very difficult for the ex-
pert physician to offer definite conclusions about any particular pa-
tient."' 06 Empirical studies shed some light on the degree of
uncertainty involved in the psychiatric diagnosis. 0 7 Ennis and
Litwack made a comprehensive survey of the professional litera-
ture evaluating the validity and reliability of psychiatric judg-
ments.108 They found that the empirical investigations revealed
that psychiatrists were frequently unable to agree on even very
broad diagnostic categorizations of patients, and that "they dis-
agree more often than not on more specific diagnoses .... 1109
These authors also reviewed a number of studies which have at-
tempted to determine the accuracy with which psychiatrists can
determine whether a patient needs to be institutionalized.
In each study individuals who had been examined in a hospital admission
ward and found to require full-time hospitalization and treatment were
randomly divided into two groups. One group was hospitalized and the
other was treated in the community or in a day hospital or on an outpa-
tient basis. Over a substantial period of time, only a few of the community
patients failed to get along in the community and had to be hospitalized.
In fact, the community patients recovered faster than the hospitalized pa-
tients .... 110
of judges. What is best for the child is an individual medical decision
that must be left to the judgment of physicians in each case.
Id. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2507.
105. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2507.
106. Addington v. Texas, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 1804,1811 (1979). See also O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). "The Court appropriately takes notice at the
uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis and therapy, and the reported cases are
replete with evidence of the divergence of medical opinion in this vexing
area." Id. at 579 (Berger, C. J., concurring).
107. See, e.g., Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, Reliability of Psychiatric
Diagnosis: A Study of Consistency of Clinical Judgments and Ratings, 119
AM. J. PSYCH. 351 (1962); Schmidt & Fonda, The Reliability of Psychiatric Di-
agnosis: A New Look, 52 J. OF ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCH. 262 (1956); Stoller
& Geertsma, The Consistency of Psychiatrists' Clinical Judgments, 137 J. OF
NERvous AND MENTAL DISEASES 58 (1963). See generally J. ZisxIN, COPING
WTrrH PsYcHIATRIc AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (2d ed. 1975).
108. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. I REV. 693 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Psy-
chiatric Expertise].
109. Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 718.
1980]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
On the basis of these and many other studies, Ennis and Litwack
conclude that psychiatric judgments of whether to commit have
not been shown to be substantially more reliable or valid than
judgments based on the flip of a coin."'
These authors are not alone in concluding that psychiatric diag-
nosis contains a very high risk of error.1 1 2 Perhaps the most vivid
illustration of the dangers of psychiatric misdiagnosis was the fa-
mous study conducted by Rosenhan"1 3 in which eight sane persons
(three psychologists, a pediatrician, a psychiatrist, a painter, a
housewife, and a graduate student in psychology) gained admis-
sion to twelve mental hospitals of varying reputations and loca-
tions across the country. In order to gain admission, the
"pseudopatients" reported hearing voices which they thought
were saying "empty," "hollow," or "thud". Beyond alleging these
symptoms and falsifying name and vocation, the pseudopatients
gave truthful life histories and accurately answered all questions,
behaving in a "normal" and cooperative manner. All were found to
be mentally ill and were admitted. Over the course of their hospi-
talization, which lasted anywhere from seven to fifty-two days,
none of the pseudopatients was detected. They were released not
on the basis of being sane or cured, but because their illness was
"in remission." On hearing these findings, the staff of another
mental hospital expressed doubt that such a phenomenon could
occur at their facility. The staff was informed that over the next
three months, one or more pseudopatients would attempt to gain
admission to this hospital. During this period, forty-one patients
were identified, with a high degree of confidence, as pseudopa-
tients by at least one member of the staff. In fact, no pseudopa-
tients had presented themselves. Rosenhan concludes that "one
thing is certain: any diagnostic process that lends itself so readily
to massive errors of this sort cannot be a very reliable one."1 14
In the face of such evidence establishing the unreliability of
psychiatric diagnosis, the value of an independent psychiatric
evaluation as a check on the parent's or guardian's initial decision
to commit would seem to be dubious at best."15 While the Parham
111. Id. at 743.
112. See, e.g., note 107 supra; Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitaliza-
tion and Psychiatric Testimony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate
Perception, 6 CAP. U. L REv. 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Psychiatric Testi-
mony] (reviewing the research literature and concluding that psychiatry
lacks precise definitions which can be consistently applied).
113. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973).
114. Id. at 252.
115. Quoting from the deposition of Dr. John P. Filley, Director, Child and Mental
Health Services for the state of Georgia, the district court said:
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Court acknowledged that the medical decision-making process is
not error-free," 6 it characterized misdiagnoses as "rare excep-
tions," and stated that "we are satisfied that an independent medi-
cal decision-making process... will protect children who should
not be admitted .... ,117 The relevant research does not justify
this conclusion. Furthermore, the study undertaken at the request
of Georgia's Director of the Division of Mental Health" 8 indicated
that more than half of the institutionalized juveniles in that state's
mental hospitals did not require hospitalization. 119 The independ-
ent psychiatric evaluation is an effective safeguard neither in the-
ory nor in practice.
The Parham Court discussed the sufficiency of formal or quasi-
formal hearings with regard to due process requirements.
120 It is
clear that such hearings have not in all cases proven to be effective
safeguards against erroneous commitment.' 2 1 The shortcomings
most frequently cited are the short duration typical of such hear-
ings,122 the overreliance on expert testimony,123 and the failure of
counsel adequately to defend the prospective patient's rights.
124
These inadequacies have frequently resulted in "the allocation of
effective decision-making to the medical, more particularly the
psychiatric, profession with the legal process and the attorney as-
suming a ceremonial function."12
These considerations led the Supreme Court in Parham to con-
In sum and substance Dr. Filley testified that the decision to hospi-
talize for care and treatment comes about in the following manner.
"The parent may come in saying, 'I can't handle it any more; do
something'; And, they say at the hospital or it might be the psychia-
trist who says, 'I think hospitalization is indicated.' The parent would
agree and that would decide it."
412 F. Supp. at 134.
116. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2509.
117. Id.
118. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
119. 412 F. Supp. at 122.
120. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2506-09.
121. See, e.g., Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Psychiatric Testimony, supra note 112;
Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44 U. TEX. L. REV. 424 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Attorney's Function].
122. See Albers & Pasewark, Involuntary Hospitalization" Surrender at the Court-
house, 2 Am. J. CoMneTmrrY PSYCH. 287 (1974) (mean time for hearings was 9.2
minutes); Cohen, Attorney's Function, supra note 114 (40 hearings were con-
ducted in a total of 75 minutes); Miller & Schwartz, County Lunacy Commis-
sion Hearings: Some Observations of Commitment to a State Mental
Hospital, 14 Soc. PROB. 26 (1966) (mean hearing time of 4.4 minutes).
123. See Psychiatric Testimony, supra note 112; Psychiatric Expertise, supra note
102.
124. See Attorney's Function, supra note 121; Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil
Commitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 CAT. L REV. 816 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Role of Counsel].
125. Attorney's Function, supra note 121, at 424-25.
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elude that a formal judicial-type hearing would not significantly re-
duce the risk of erroneous commitment.126 This conclusion is very
difficult to reconcile with the holding of Addington v. Texas,127 de-
cided by the Supreme Court last year. The issue in that case was
the standard of proof constitutionally required in an adult civil
commitment hearing. The Court held that something beyond the
preponderance of the evidence standard was required by due proc-
ess, because "[t]he individual should not be asked to share
equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to
the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the
state... ."128 Thus, the Addington Court held that a hearing em-
ploying the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof signifi-
cantly reduces the risk of erroneous commitment as compared to a
hearing using a preponderance of the evidence standard. This im-
plies that an appropriately structured hearing can be of significant
value in reducing the risks of error.
While it is clear that commitment hearings have very often
been inadequate as procedural safeguards, 129 it is not clear that
they could not be made effective. The problem has been recog-
nized in the academic literature; prominent among the suggestions
offered are clarifying the role and increasing the effectiveness of
council, 30 and limiting or even excluding expert psychiatric testi-
mony.131 The Parham Court simply discounted the possibility that
hearings might significantly reduce the risk of erroneous commit-
ment, apparently without considering the potential efficacy of
these modifications.
132
C. Governmental Interests
Several distinct interests of the state are affected by the com-
mitment of juveniles to its mental institutions and by the nature of
the process by which this is accomplished. First, the state has an
interest in the future development of the child. 33 This implies
126. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2509.
127. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
128. Id. at--, 99 S. Ct. at 1810.
129. See notes 121-25 & accompanying text supra.
130. See, e.g., Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil
Commitment" A Survey, A Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. LJ. 43 (1974);
Attorney's Function, supra note 121; Role of Counsel, supra note 124 See
also Nemmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977) (requiring "ad-
versary counsel" in civil commitment proceedings).
131. See, e.g., Psychiatric Expertise, supra note 108, at 734-47. See also Washing-
ton v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (discussing the propriety of
psychiatric experts testifying in conclusory terms in the context of the in-
sanity defense).
132. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2508-09.
133. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (recognizing the physical and
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both an interest in avoiding erroneous commitment and in provid-
ing appropriate care and treatment when needed,1 4 and thus nar-
rows down to an interest in ensuring accuracy of diagnosis.
Second, the state has an obvious financial interest in restricting
the use of its facilities to those genuinely in need of care. 135 Once
again, this interest is most directly served by procedures which
minimize erroneous commitments. Third, the state has an interest
in avoiding unduly burdensome procedures, not only because of
financial and administrative costs, 3 6 but also because of the unde-
sirability of placing unnecessary procedural obstacles in the way
of parents who might thereby be discouraged from seeking needed
help for their children. Finally, the state has an interest in pre-
serving the family unit.13 7
The Parham Court suggests that the state's interest in the fam-
ily unit is best served by allowing the parent to have the major
voice in the commitment decision and thus avoiding the pitting of
parent and child against each other as adversaries in a hearing. 3 8
It is argued that such a confrontation would adversely stress the
family relationship and make it more difficult for the parent to as-
sist the child during and after treatment. 3 9 On the other hand, it
is the child who wishes to remain with the parents; they are the
ones seeking to have him removed from the family unit.140 The
Court in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth141 was not
persuaded that the interests of preserving the family unit were
served by a grant of authority where the conflict "already has frac-
tured the family structure."' 42
mental health of a child, as well as his future ability to be self-supporting and
ability to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship as legitimate
state concerns); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (recognizing
that state has an interest in securing the well-rounded growth of young peo-
ple against a wide range of dangers and restraints); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d
921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal Rptr. 298 (1977) (recognizing societal interest in
avoiding erroneous commitment of child based on nmisdiagnosis). Cf. Morris-
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S 471 (1972) (recognizing interest in state of having pa-
rolee restored to useful life and thus an interest in not allowing his parole to
be revoked on erroneous information).
134. See note 133 supra.
135. The State of Georgia estimated the annual cost of care in a state mental hos-
pital to be $40,000 per child. 412 F. Supp. at 125-26.
136. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) "[E]xperience with the consti-
tutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional
cost... would not be insubstantial." Id. at 347.
137. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
138. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2508.
139. Id.
140. See In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d at 934, 569 P.2d at 1291, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
141. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
142. Id. at 75.
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While the state interests are diverse and perhaps even some-
what contradictory, it is clear that they would be served by reduc-
ing the risk of erroneous diagnosis and commitment. However, a
procedure which would accomplish this end at the cost of discour-
aging parents from seeking needed help for their children or by
pitting parents against children in an adversary proceeding would
arguably disserve state interests in the child and in the family unit.
An expensive or time consuming procedure would obviously dis-
serve state fiscal interests.
HI. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
Once the interests of the parties involved have been defined,
and the probable value and costs of possible safeguards deter-
mined, the difficult task remains of balancing these factors and es-
tablishing the minimum requirements of due process.14 3 The
balance struck in adult commitment and in juvenile delinquency
proceedings will provide useful analogies. In the case of adult in-
voluntary civil commitment proceedings, where the interests and
risks closely parallel those of "voluntary" juvenile commitment
proceedings, it now seems virtually certain that due process re-
quires a full adversarial hearing before a neutral tribunal. The
Court has mandated strict procedural safeguards in the analogous
area of quasi-criminal commitment;14 4 at least a minority of Jus-
tices have read this case broadly enough to require the same pro-
tections in adult civil commitment cases. 145 Recently, the
Supreme Court has held that the standard of proof in an adult in-
voluntary civil commitment proceeding must be more stringent
than a mere preponderance of the evidence because of the risks a
lesser standard would pose for erroneous commitment. 14 If due
process is not satisfied by a full and fair adversarial hearing em-
ploying the preponderance of evidence standard, it would seem
143. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, -
U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976). See also note 43 supra.
144. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
145. In the absence of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, adults
facing commitment to mental institutions are entitled to full and fair
adversarial hearings in which the necessity for their commitment is
established to the satisfaction of a neutral tribunal. At such hearings
they must be accorded the right to be present with counsel, have an
opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against
them], have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of[their] own.
- U.S. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2516 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting) (quoting Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967)).
146. Addington v. Texas, - U.S. - 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
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that anything less than such a hearing would be afortiori uncon-
stitutional.
In another line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that due
process requires strict procedural safeguards in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. 147 With few exceptions, 148 juveniles now en-
joy the same safeguards as adult criminal defendants. Although
these proceedings are nominally "civil" and their purpose is reha-
bilitative rather than punitive, the Court has refused to be
deceived by appearances and representations. 149 The ultimate ef-
fect on the juvenile, i.e., loss of liberty through incarceration and
stigmatization, is virtually the same as the effect of criminal pro-
ceedings on the adult offender. Since the same interests are at
stake, "it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not re-
quire the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in
the phrase 'due process.' "'so
The interests to be balanced and the risks of error in the three
contexts of "voluntary" civil commitment of juveniles, involuntary
civil commitment of adults, and juvenile delinquency proceedings,
are virtually identical in many respects. The individual has, in all
three cases, a liberty interest 151 in being free of unnecessary con-
finement and stigmatization. While it might be argued that a juve-
nile has only a conditional liberty interest, 52 and thus does not
require the full panoply of procedural safeguards afforded an adult
who is subject to commitment, this cannot be squared with the ju-
venile delinquency line of cases. Both the minor alleged to be
mentally ill and the minor alleged to be delinquent have only con-
ditional liberty interests. The degree to which this interest is in-
vaded by a finding of delinquency is substantially the same as the
degree of infringement attendant upon a finding of "mental ill-
ness" and "suitability for treatment." The net result is incarcera-
tion for treatment or rehabilitation in both cases. The justification
147. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (requiring adequate notice, right to
counsel, retained or appointed, right against self-incrimination, right to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)
(placing procedural restrictions on the power of juvenile courts to waive ju-
risdiction).
148. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that due process
does not require jury trials in juvenile proceedings because of the potentially
damaging effects on juvenile offenders and juvenile courts). In Gault, the
Court refrained from deciding whether states must provide judicial review of
juvenile proceedings or a transcript of the hearings. 387 U.S. at 57-58.
149. See, e.g., the Court's characterization of the juvenile court process and reha-
bilitative treatment in Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-29.
150. Id. at 27-28.
151. See § III-A of text supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
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for the radical difference in procedural safeguards, therefore, can-
not find its basis in either the nature of the interest subject to cur-
tailment or the degree to which the interest is invaded.
The interests of the state153 in conserving the administrative re-
sources consumed in adversarial hearings and in restricting the
use of its costly rehabilitative facilities to those truly in need are
the same in all three contexts. The interest in the future develop-
ment of its children should be no less for those labeled delinquent
than for those labeled mentally ill. The interest in preserving the
family unit might arguably be served by giving parents a promi-
nent place in juvenile commitment proceedings. In addition, the
state might deem it unwise to place substantial procedural obsta-
cles in the way of parents who might thereby be deterred from
seeking help for children who genuinely need institutional ther-
apy. Since the state interests which might be asserted in justifica-
tion of lesser procedural safeguards are inextricably tied to
parental interests they will be included in the discussion of that
topic below.
15 4
The probable value of procedural safeguards in reducing the
risk of erroneous deprivations of liberty is, as previously stated,
155
another factor to be balanced in determining the requirements of
due process. The Parham Court expressed the belief that adver-
sarial hearings would be of little or no value in reducing that
risk.156 In Addington, the Court concluded that because the issues
involved in a civil commitment proceeding were psychiatric in na-
ture, the reasonable doubt standard of proof was not required.
5 7
Psychiatric conclusions can rarely reach the level of certainty with
which the "straight-forward factual questions"'158 of a criminal or a
juvenile delinquency proceeding can be resolved. However, the
Court also held that the preponderance of the evidence standard
did not adequately protect the prospective patient from erroneous
commitment, and thus mandated a more restrictive standard. 159 If
the difference in risk entailed in the use of two different standards
of proof is constitutionally significant, it is hard to see how the
hearing itself is without value. Since the factual issues are essen-
tially of a psychiatric nature in both adult and juvenile commit-
ment proceedings, it would seem logical to conclude that an
adversarial hearing would be equally useful for reducing the risk
of error in both contexts.
153. See § rn-C of text supra.
154. See notes 157-61 infra.
155. See § I-B of text supra.
156. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2509.
157. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 1811.
158. Id.
159. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 1810.
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The unique feature of juvenile commitment proceedings which
most convincingly distinguishes them from juvenile delinquency
and adult commitment proceedings is the involvement of the par-
ent. While other factors were given some weight by the language
of Parham, the same factors were not considered of sufficient im-
portance in adult commitment or juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings to justify abandonment of full adversarial hearings. 60
Parham is thus best read as a strong endorsement of parental au-
thority. This is in accord with the common law presumption that
parents act in the best interests of their children' 61 and the power
granted parents ordinarily to make medical decisions in the child's
behalf.
16 2
A number of considerations militate against positing parental
authority as a superordinate value in the context of juvenile com-
mitment. As discussed above, many factors extraneous to the best
interests of the child may enter into the parental decision to seek
commitment. 63 In addition, when medical decisions substantially
impair a protected liberty interest of the child, it may be highly
inappropriate, as recognized in Danforth, to give parents a broad
grant of authority to make those decisions.16 4
IV. THE HIDDEN ISSUE-THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEAST
RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
One important issue raised by the Parham case, but virtually
ignored in the Supreme Court opinion, is the applicability of the
doctrine of the least restrictive alternative to the commitment of
juveniles. The remedy prescribed by the district court in J.L. v.
Parham65 required the defendant state officials "to provide neces-
sary physical resources and personnel for whatever non-hospital
facilities are deemed by them to be most appropriate for these chil-
dren, and.., to place these children in such non-hospital facilities
as soon as reasonably appropriate. . . ,166 It further required the
defendants to spend whatever state funds were reasonably neces-
sary to provide these alternatives. 167 The usual due process in-
quiry examines only the nature of the proceeding in order to
160. See text accompanying notes 141-56 supra.
161. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2504.
162. See text accompanying notes 80-86 supra.
163. See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra. See also Comment, "Voluntary"
Admission of Children to Mental Hospitals: A conflict of Interest Between
Parent and Child, 36 MD. L REV. 153 (1976).
164. See text accompanying notes 74-86 supra.
165. 412 F. Supp. at 139-40.
166. Id. at 139.
167. Id. at 139-40. The court went so far as to specify the non-hospital alternatives
from which the defendants might choose. Id.
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determine if it adequately protects the various interests in-
volved.168 In going beyond this to consider the types of alternative
dispositions which must be made available to the decision-maker,
the court implicitly invoked the doctrine of the least restrictive al-
ternative.1
69
Simply stated, the doctrine holds that "governmental action
must not intrude upon constitutionally protected interests to a de-
gree greater than necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose."'
7 0 It
has been constitutionally applied to curb undue governmental in-
trusions in a variety of contexts.171 In the area of personal liber-
ties, the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative has been
invoked, for example, to overturn anti-contraceptive legislation
which unnecessarily invaded the right to marital privacy,172 and to
hold unconstitutional a law infringing unnecessarily on the right to
travel.173 If the Constitution prohibits the intrusion on these per-
sonal liberties beyond the minimum necessary to achieve legiti-
mate state ends, the same principle might arguably be applied to
prohibit unwarranted physical confinement. The Supreme Court
has recognized that commitment to a mental institution inevitably
entails a "massive curtailment of liberty"' 74 and affects "funda-
mental rights.'
7 5
The least restrictive alternative doctrine assumes, of course, the
existence of effective alternatives to the challenged state action. In
order to determine what constitutes an effective alternative, it is
necessary first to determine the end served by the legislation.
7 6
In the case of commitment of juveniles to mental hospitals, the
state has an interest in the future development and well-being of
the child, his ability to discharge the duties and responsibilities of
citizenship, and his future ability to be self-supporting. 7 7 In short,
the state end will be served by any effective form of treatment
168. See, e.g., Greenhholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Com-
plex, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
169. See generally, Alternatives to Commitmen4 supra note 46; Hoffman & Foust,
Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in Search of Its
Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L REv. 1100 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Least Restric-
tive Treatment].
170. Least Restrictive Treatment, supra note 167, at 1101.
171. See generally Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Eco-
nomic Due Process, 80 HARv. L REV. 1463 (1967); Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doc-
trine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTA L. REv. 254 (1964); Note, Less
Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE I.J. 464 (1969).
172. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
173. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
174. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
175. Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 113 (1966).
176. See, Alternatives to Commitmen4 supra note 52, at 1112-37.
177. See note 133 supra.
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which helps the child recover as fully as possible from his mental
illness or retardation. There is a growing body of research indicat-
ing that various forms of community treatment programs, e.g., out-
patient care, day hospital care or home care services, are as effec-
tive or more effective than in-patient hospital care for a large per-
centage of patients.17 8 These programs are not only much less
restrictive of the patients' liberty, but they also avoid the positive
dangers to mental health that institutionalization can pose.
7 9
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue of
whether the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative has appli-
cation in the area of civil commitment. Some lower courts have
construed commitment statutes to require consideration of less re-
strictive alternatives, 8 0 while others have held that such consider-
ation is constitutionally required.' 8 ' The Supreme Court has
several times hinted that the Constitution might require place-
ment in the least restrictive setting. For example, in Jackson v. In-
diana,18 2 the Court stated that "at the least, due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed."'
83
The issue was squarely before the Court on the appeal from a state
court decision in State v. Sanchez; 84 however, the appeal was dis-
missed "for want of a substantial federal question."' 85 While this
technically constitutes a disposition on the merits and may be con-
178. J. HOENIG & M. HAMILTON, THE DESEGREGATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1969);
B. PAsAmAmcK, F. SCARP=ri & S. Dnrz, SCHIZOPHRENICS IN THE COMMUNITY
(1967); Wilder, Levin & Zwerling, A Two-Year-Follow-Up Evaluation ofAcute
Psychotic Patients Treated in a Day Hospital, 122 Am. J. PSYCH. 1095 (1966).
179. See note 51 supra.
180. See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (in which the court
applied the doctrine on statutory grounds but indicated that it is also consti-
tutionally required); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Dixon v.
Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
181. See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439,452-53 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Davis
v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1095-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473
(1974); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Penn. 1971).
182. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
183. Id. at 738. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) where the
Court said-
the mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person
from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover,
while the State may arguably confine a person to save him from
harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising
the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom
on their own or with the help of family and friends ......
Id. at 575.
184. 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1970).
185. 396 U.S. at 276.
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strued as foreclosing the issue,186 many lower federal courts ap-
pear to be ignoring the dismissal.
187
The least restrictive alternative issue is of crucial importance in
the context of civil commitment of juveniles. In the case of juve-
nile wards of the state, many of whom will be unable to find adop-
tive parents 188 and will be forced to remain in state custody, the
restrictiveness of the setting will often be the only significant is-
sue. Unlike adult commitment where the dispositional alterna-
tives can be framed in black and white, i.e., incarceration or
release, many juveniles are faced only with different shades of
gray-a number of dispositions imposing various degrees of re-
straint. Where the issue was so clearly raised' 89 and the context so
apt, it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court in Parham chose not
to address the question squarely, allowing it to be decided, as it
were, by default.190
V. CONCLUSION
The balancing of important competing values is a difficult task
at best, and it is made no easier when procedural structure must
be erected on the slippery foundation of our present psychiatric
knowledge. In the final analysis, a single psychiatric examination
does not afford a minor adequate protection against the substantial
risks of erroneous incarceration. Reflecting on this fundamental
concern, Justice Brandeis stated:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficient. Men born of freedom
186. See, Alternatives to Commitment, supra note 52, at 1151-53.
187. See note 178 supra.
188. Children who have physical handicaps, emotional problems, or other
problems such as enuresis are difficult to place. In fact, children who have
committed no sin greater than attaining school age have little chance of find-
ing adoptive homes, and those who have reached their teens have virtually
none. 412 F. Supp. at 134-35.
189. Each of the named plaintiffs requested "an order of the court placing him in a
less drastic environment suitable to his needs." - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
See also 412 F. Supp. at 139-40.
190. The Court made no reference in its opinion to the consideration of less dras-
tic alternatives mandated by the district court beyond noting that "the court
*. . shifted its focus drastically from what was clearly a procedural due proc-
ess analysis to what appears to be a substantive due process analysis. .. ."
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2502. The Court's apparent perplexity is difficult to
understand in light of the number of cases involving the doctrine of the least
restrictive alternative in the context of civil commitment which were brought
to the Court's attention. Brief of the American Bar Assoc. Amicus Curiae at
23-24, Parham v. J.R., - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
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are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil minded rulers.
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding.
1 9 1
James Herbsleb '80
191. Quoted in A. SUTHERLAND, THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967, 83 (1968).
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